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INTRODUCTION
Information is the lifeblood of a knowledge-based economy. The con-
trol of data and the ability to translate them into meaningful information is
indispensable to businesspeople, policymakers, scientists, engineers, re-
searchers, students, and consumers. Having useful, and at times exclusive,
information improves productivity, advances education and training, and
helps create a more informed citizenry. As the National Information Infra-
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structure Taskforce of the Clinton Administration observed:
Information is one of the nation's most critical economic resources, for
service industries as well as manufacturing, for economic as well as na-
tional security. By one estimate, two-thirds of U.S. workers are in infor-
mation-related jobs, and the rest are in industries that rely heavily on
information. In an era of global markets and global competition, the
technologies to create, manipulate, manage and use information are of
strategic importance for the United States.1
To underscore the growing importance of information in the New
Economy and the high economic value of data, Nicholas Negroponte re-
counted his visit to a leading U.S. integrated circuit manufacturer in the
beginning of his book, Being Digital:
I was asked to sign in and, in the process, was asked whether I had a lap-
top computer with me. Of course I did. The receptionist asked for the
model and serial number and for its value. "Roughly, between one and
two million dollars," I said. "Oh, that cannot be, sir," she replied. "What
do you mean? Let me see it." I showed her my old PowerBook and she
estimated its value at $2,000. She wrote down that amount and I was al-
lowed to enter the premises. The point is that while the atoms were not
worth that much, the bits were almost priceless.2
Although data have always been valuable, their value was not as
greatly appreciated as it is today. In the past, data were protected primarily
for their ability to enhance the value of other goods or services, rather than
for their inherent value. Secrecy, family control, or the use of physical de-
vices, like locks and safes, often protected valuable data, such as those
contained in customer lists, inventory files, and sales records. As the legal
system became more developed and as sophisticated technologies emerged,
trade secret, misappropriation and unfair competition laws, contracts, and
technological protection measures were being deployed to offer additional
protection.
In the past two decades, those who collected or obtained access to a
large amount of data began to explore ways to use the collected data as an
income stream. Because the then-existing laws did not offer adequate pro-
tection for that particular purpose, they began to lobby for new sui generis
rights to protect uncopyrightable collections of data. Meanwhile, pharma-
ceutical and agrochemical manufacturers were seeking to use their control
of clinical trial data as an offensive strategy to protect markets and invest-
ment. As part of this effort, these manufacturers lobbied for the protection
of test data submitted to regulatory authorities for the marketing approval
1. INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA
FOR ACTION 7 (1993).
2. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 11-12 (1995).
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of pharmaceutical and agrochemical products.
At the international level, the development of laws to protect data
assets, which this article will collectively describe as data protection laws, 3
has become even more intriguing. Because data can flow freely and easily
from one country to another, countries that offer strong data protection tend
to attract investment from data providers, such as database producers,
pharmaceutical and agrochemical manufacturers, and other businesses that
consider data an important asset. Meanwhile, countries that offer weaker
protection provide equally attractive environments for businesses whose
operations depend on the wide availability of free or cheap pre-existing
data. If protection is minimal, these countries can also serve as havens for
data pirates.
In light of the very different protection offered in these countries,
businesses have engaged in regulatory arbitrage by relocating their opera-
tions to jurisdictions that offer more favorable legal environments. 4 To
attract foreign investment and to retain local businesses, countries now
actively participate in a "race" to either the top or the bottom. Although this
article focuses mainly on the "race to the top," which has resulted in the
ratcheting up of intellectual property protection, it is important to remem-
ber that the reform efforts needed for either race often incur significant
costs. By adopting an intellectual property system that ignores the balance
between access and protection, countries will ultimately harm their econo-
mies by introducing laws that are not tailored to their interests, goals, and
local conditions.
Part I of this article recounts the development of two new forms of
data protection. It begins by examining the development of sui generis
database protection. It discusses the protection of the EC Database Direc-
tive, the United States' resistance to sui generis database protection, and
the eventual failure of the proposed World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) Database Treaty. Part I then focuses on the development of
data exclusivity laws in less developed countries. In particular, it examines
3. Although commentators have used the term "data protection" to describe the protection of
personal data as viewed from the standpoint of consumers and policymakers, the term is used through-
out this article to describe the protection of data assets as viewed from the standpoint of data providers
and intellectual property rights holders. To emphasize the intersectionality between data protection and
other areas, such as privacy, the term refers to both the protection of personal data and the protection of
data assets in infra Part III.C.
4. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE:
INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 205, 219-21 (Brian Kahin &
Charles Nesson eds., 1997) [hereinafter BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE]; A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet
as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra, at 129, 142; Pamela Samuel-
son, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI.
L. REv. 223, 225-26 (2004).
2010]
CHICA GO-KENT LA WREVIEW
the United States' use of free trade agreements to transplant data exclusivi-
ty laws abroad and highlights the many problems brought about by such
transplantation.
Part II discusses the concerns raised by the undemocratic processes
used to develop these laws and treaties. Focusing on "policy laundering"
and "backdoor lawmaking," this Part explains why these efforts are harm-
ful to both the United States and the larger international community. To
help alleviate these problems, Part III then offers suggestions on how to
recalibrate the balance of the intellectual property system. Part IV con-
cludes with a plea for caution concerning the development of new intellec-
tual property rights to protect data, drawing on the European Commission's
recent evaluation of the EC Database Directive.
I. DATA PROTECTION
A. Database Protection
To help explain the emerging development of data protection at both
the domestic and international levels, this article begins with two stories.
The first story began in 1996, when the European Community promulgated
the EC Database Directive.5 The Directive requires all the then fifteen (and
now twenty-seven) member states to offer sui generis protection to data-
bases that are created as a result of "substantial investment" by database
producers. 6 In addition, the Directive protects databases against unautho-
rized extraction and reutilization for a renewable term of fifteen years re-
gardless of their eligibility for copyright protection.7
To the detriment of U.S. database producers, the Directive includes a
reciprocity provision that denies protection to databases produced in coun-
tries that fail to offer comparable protection. 8 To maintain the competitive
advantage of U.S. database producers, Congress considered many legisla-
tive proposals in the mid-to-late 1990s to strengthen database protection.
Nevertheless, all of these proposals failed, and the United States, as of this
writing, has yet to offer sui generis database protection.
The cold reception of database protection can be largely attributed to
the 1991 case of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,9 a
key United States Supreme Court decision that disqualified the white pages
5. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC).
6. Id. art. 7.
7. Id. arts. 7, 10.
8. Id. art. 11.
9. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
[Vol 84:3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DATA PROTECTION
of a telephone directory for copyright protection. 10 As the Court declared,
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement."' "I A compilation is therefore
not worthy of copyright protection unless information in the compilation is
selected, coordinated, or arranged in an original manner. 12 Under the
Court's reasoning, nonoriginal, noncreative databases would not qualify for
copyright protection even if a substantial amount of labor and capital had
been expended to create those databases. Because the proposed sui generis
database protection legislation sought to offer protection under this rejected
"sweat of the brow" theory, it was very unlikely to pass constitutional mus-
ter under the Copyright Clause. 13 Such legislation also raised serious con-
stitutional questions under both the Commerce Clause and the First
Amendment. 14
To make things worse, many considered sui generis database protec-
tion to be bad public policy whose costs were likely to outweigh its bene-
fits.15 For example, the protection would confer far broader and stronger
exclusive rights on database contents than necessary to provide the needed
incentives for database producers. By granting a monopoly over collected
data, such protection would also allow private entities to lock up informa-
tion that was essential to basic scientific research and future creative en-
deavors. In addition, sui generis protection would make information
products more expensive by creating an anti-competitive environment that
would make it difficult for valued-added products and services to enter the
market. Finally, the additional protection was considered unnecessary be-
cause database producers already enjoyed significant protection under state
contract, misappropriation, and unfair competition laws as well as through
the use of technological protection measures.
10. Id. at 364.
11. Id. at 346.
12. See id. at 358-59.
13. See id. at 352-56, 360.
14. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535,
548-57 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605,
621-28 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of
the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 47, 54-74 (1999).
15. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in
the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 176 (1997); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuel-
son, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 55-56, 113-36 (1997); J.H. Reichman
& Paul F. UWlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on
Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 799-821 (1999); Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonze-
ro-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Me-
diators, Business Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CN. L. REV. 569, 624-25
(2002).
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The biggest stumbling block to the passage of sui generis database
protection legislation, however, was politics. At the time the bills were
proposed, only one of the three major stakeholders in the database industry,
McGraw-Hill, was an American company. 16 The other two, Reed-Elsevier
and Thomson (now Thomson Reuters), were European and Canadian com-
panies, respectively. As a result, the proposed legislation did not get much
traction on Capitol Hill. Instead of providing substantial facts on the harm
that the lack of Congressional responses would cause to the U.S. database
industry, the sponsors and proponents of this legislation were able to make
only generalized claims of potential foreign competition and piracy in Eu-
ropean markets. 17 Because many businesses were both producers and users
of data, they remained reluctant to support stronger database protection
until they were certain that the proposed legislation would strike the appro-
priate balance between the production of databases and the use of collected
information.
Notwithstanding the immense controversy surrounding the domestic
proposals, the U.S. administration skillfully circumvented the domestic
legislative process by actively pushing for the adoption of a draft treaty
proposal by the WIPO.18 Modeled after the EC Database Directive, the
proposed treaty called for the protection of databases for a term of twenty-
five years, which could be renewed indefinitely upon the showing of sub-
stantial changes to the database contents. Although WIPO considered the
draft treaty in the 1996 diplomatic conference, along with the WIPO Copy-
right Treaty' 9 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,2 0 the
strong disagreement among the member states and the active participation
of academics and nongovernmental organizations successfully prevented
WIPO from adopting such a treaty. 21
B. Data Exclusivity
The second story concerns the increasing international protection of
undisclosed information, which "has never been the subject of any multila-
16. See Benkler, supra note 14, at 592.
17. See id. at 591-92; Pollack, supra note 14, at 90-96; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at
70.
18. For discussions of the U.S. draft proposal of the WIPO Database Treaty, see Reichman &
Samuelson, supra note 15, at 102-10; Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 369, 422-23 (1997) [hereinafter Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda].
19. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, at 1 (1997).
20. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at
18(1997).
21. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Re-
gime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 323, 372 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents].
[Vol 84:3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DATA PROTECTION
teral agreement" until the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement). 22 Article 39(3)
of the TRIPs Agreement requires member states to protect against unfair
commercial use of the undisclosed information submitted for the marketing
approval of products that utilize new chemical entities.23 The protected
information includes the clinical trial data that regulatory agencies collect
as part of the effort to evaluate the efficacy, quality, and safety of new
pharmaceutical and agrochemical products.
Notably, Article 39(3) does not offer broad protection of these test
data. Instead, it includes two very narrow conditions. First, the provision
offers protection against unfair competition; it does not create exclusive
rights in the collected data. Second, the protection applies only to products
utilizing new chemical entities; it was not intended for "existing chemical
entities that have been reformulated or sold for a new indication. '' 24 Not-
withstanding the limited scope of Article 39(3), the United States, the Eu-
ropean Community, and their pharmaceutical and agrochemical industries
have broadly interpreted the provision to cover a new data exclusivity re-
gime that is similar to those currently in place in those regions.25
To transplant data exclusivity laws abroad, the United States, in recent
years, has entered into bilateral or regional free trade agreements with
many less developed countries.26 These agreements require countries to
prohibit the use by third parties of clinical trial data that have been submit-
ted to regulatory authorities for the marketing approval of pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products. Article 15.10.1 of the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, for example, requires each
signatory country to offer exclusive protection of undisclosed test data "for
at least five years for pharmaceutical products and ten years for agricultural
22. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 4 (200 1).
23. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39(3), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
24. Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151, 166 (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey & David
Vivas-Eugui eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
25. See Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market
Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 24, at 97, 102-04 (describing the U.S. data exclusivity
regime).
26. The United States is not the only country that has aggressively pushed for these bilateral or
regional trade agreements. Nevertheless, this article focuses on the U.S.-initiated agreements because of
their representativeness for the recent bilateral and regional efforts, their considerable implications for
public health, and their differences from similar agreements initiated by the European Community,
which are often filled with more compromises among its many member states.
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chemical products. '27 Similar provisions can be found in the United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, 28 the United States-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement,29 and many other recently-negotiated free trade agreements.
The economic rationale behind these data exclusivity provisions is
simple and easy-to-understand. As the pharmaceutical industry has
claimed, "[t]he development and bringing to market of a new drug requires
the originator to conduct extensive chemical, pharmacological, toxicologi-
cal and clinical research and testing, at an average cost of US$800 million,
and taking 10 to 15 years to complete. '30 Because of the high costs of data
collection and the large amount of time involved, additional protection,
other than what pharmaceutical manufacturers already received under the
patent system, is necessary to protect their investment. Such protection
would also prevent third parties, in particular generic competitors, from
free riding on the originator's efforts in collecting data during clinical tri-
als. Viewed in this light, data exclusivity laws are less important as a means
to generate incentives than for its ability to effectively erect a market entry
barrier that extends the originator's limited monopolies.
Notwithstanding these justifications, commentators have found the
need for data exclusivity laws economically dubious. Although the costs of
clinical trials remain high and could make up for a major portion of the
research and development costs of new drugs, 31 companies already have
considerable incentives under the current patent system. They also have
received significant support from public funding to conduct research and
development. 32 While pharmaceutical manufacturers may still need incen-
tives to obtain marketing approval for their products, most of the marketing
costs are already included in the total costs that are used to justify stronger
27. Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Rep.,
art. 15.10.1, May 28, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/ Bilater-
al/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/asset.upload file934_3935.pdf.
28. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.10.1, May 18, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/Final_
Text/asset~uploadfile469_5141 .pdf.
29. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.8.1, May 6, 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/asset-
upload file708_4036.pdf.
30. Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns [IFPMA], A Review of Existing Data Exclusivity Legis-
lation in Selected Countries 3 (4th rev. ed. 2005), available at http://www.ifpma.org/ docu-
ments/NR2306/DataExclusivity_JAN05_revised.doc. But see MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT
THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 44-45 (rev. ed. 2005)
(challenging the industry's $802 million figure).
31. See Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products
Under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 24, at 81, 82 (noting that "[t]he
development of test data typically represents more than 60 percent of the research and develop-
ment ... costs of new drugs").
32. See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 837 & n.38 (2007).
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patent protection. Unless the regulatory authorities in foreign countries
require different clinical trials during the approval process, additional in-
centives seem to be unnecessary. Indeed, if data exclusivity laws are to be
adopted, one has to wonder whether existing patent rights need to be cur-
tailed proportionally to reflect the additional incentives.
Moreover, even if one can make a strong case for data exclusivity
laws in developed countries, the case for similar laws in less developed
countries is rather weak. There is simply no evidence that pharmaceutical
manufacturers cannot recoup their investment if data exclusivity is pro-
vided only in developed countries. In fact, ratcheting up protection in the
form of data exclusivity in less developed countries is unlikely to result in
greater research and development worldwide or increased foreign direct
investment in the affected countries. After all, these poor countries "pro-
vide a small share of the global pharmaceutical market and their policy
choices have a minimal impact upon the R&D investment decisions of
multinational pharmaceutical companies. ' '33
Even worse, there are serious moral and ethical implications for intro-
ducing data exclusivity laws. If pharmaceuticals become readily available
at the end of the patent term, it will be inhumane to delay the entry of com-
petitive drugs, whether on-patent or generic. Such delay, along with the
reduced price competition, is likely to prolong, or even exacerbate, the
massive public health crises in less developed countries. It is also wasteful
and highly undesirable to require duplicative testing in countries that have
very limited economic resources. Moreover, it is simply immoral to require
the use of human subjects and animals to retest drugs that are considered
bioequivalent to those that have already been approved for the market.34
If the protection is strengthened to the point that the public disclosure
of clinical trial data is forbidden, such protection would even create serious
public health and environmental risks. As Aaron Fellmeth has explained:
Disclosure of marketing approval data honors the public's interest in be-
ing informed about the safety and effectiveness of an approved drug and
allows independent observers, such as academics and public interest
groups, to conduct further testing and to verify or dispute the accuracy
and impartiality of the data submitted by the registrant. It is sometimes
observed that drug developers have an incentive to suppress unfavorable
results from their drug testing or to exaggerate their efficacy findings.
The lack of access to testing data seriously impedes third parties from
uncovering bias, inaccurate or incomplete results, and false claims based
on that data. The public may thereby be defrauded and public health ex-
33. Weissman, supra note 24, at 154.
34. See Correa, supra note 31, at 93.
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posed to unnecessary danger.35
In countries suffering from rampant corruption and a lack of govern-
ment transparency, the public availability of these data and the possibility
of using them to conduct independent evaluation are likely to be very im-
portant. Such availability not only will meet the countries' public health
needs, but will also reduce the opportunity for collusion and anticompeti-
tive behaviors.
In sum, even if there is a strong need for providing incentives for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop new and better drugs, that need
has to be balanced against the socioeconomic costs of having data exclusiv-
ity laws, the nation's public health needs, and the moral and ethical con-
cerns that such protection raises. Therefore, it is not surprising that many
commentators have proposed compromise solutions using the alternative
cost-sharing approach that will enable pharmaceutical manufacturers to
receive compensation for the high costs of the clinical trials used to obtain
marketing approval for their products. 36 To many of these commentators,
the latter's approach, although not necessarily desirable, is still far better
than the introduction of data exclusivity laws.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
A. Policy Laundering
While these two stories provide important insights into the process of
creating new intellectual property rights to protect data, they also help us
better understand the political economy of data protection. Taken together,
they describe vividly what commentators have termed "policy launder-
ing."'37 As two commentators defined:
Policy laundering" is a term that describes efforts by policy actors to
have policy initiatives seen as exogenously determined, or even seen as
requirements imposed by powerful others. The United States and the
United Kingdom are identified as policy actors that routinely push for
the establishment of regulatory standards in international policy venues
35. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International
Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J.
443, 475-76 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
36. See, e.g., id. at 482-99; Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed
Clinical Trial Data: From Private to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 24, at 133,
144-48; Weissman, supra note 24, at 155-63.
37. For discussions of "policy laundering," see, for example, David Banisar, Stopping Science:
The Case of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 253, 282-86 (1999); lan Hosein, The Sources of Laws:
Policy Dynamics in a Digital and Terrorized World, 20 INFO. SOC'Y 187, 188-89 (2004); The Policy
Laundering Project, Introduction: The Problem of Policy Laundering, http://www.policylaundering.org/
PolicyLaunderinglntro.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2009).
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so that domestic policies can be brought into line with those policies
"under the requirement of harmonization and the guise of multilateral-
ism. 38
In the first story, database protection was considered both unconstitu-
tional and inexpedient on American soil. Such protection, by contrast, was
viewed more favorably outside the United States, thanks to the warm re-
ception of sui generis database protection in Europe. Had the U.S. adminis-
tration been able to push WIPO to adopt the draft database treaty, it would
have succeeded in laundering an unpopular and ill-advised policy through
the international process. When the policy returned to the home soil for
deliberation, that policy would be likely to become more legitimate as a
result of the new-found need for international harmonization. 39 As Pamela
Samuelson surmised:
Had this effort succeeded in Geneva, Clinton administration officials
would almost certainly have then argued to Congress that ratification of
the treaties was necessary to confirm U.S. leadership in the world intel-
lectual property community and to promote the interests of U.S. copy-
right industries in the world market for information products and
services.40
Moreover, the administration's laundering effort has upset the dynam-
ics of the domestic lawmaking process. When Congress deliberates treaty-
implementing legislation, the main focus of the policy debate may no long-
er be whether the policy would benefit the American economy--or, better,
the American people. Instead, the focus may become whether the failure to
adopt such a policy would isolate the country from the international com-
munity. The tone of the debate and the congressional committees involved
may change. Even if the same committees are involved, they may have a
difficult time adapting to new international issues, which are often quite
different from the domestic issues that they are used to handling.41
Similar policy-laundering activities took place in the second story.
Although governments of less developed countries entered into the free
trade agreements based on their internal assessment, the use of the bilateral
(or regional) negotiation process successfully transformed an unpopular,
ill-advised policy to one that less powerful countries had to accept due to
their limited bargaining power in one-to-one situations. If a sufficient num-
ber of less developed countries adopt these unpopular proposals, the pres-
38. Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content Analy-
sis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 128 (2006).
39. See Hosein, supra note 37, at 188 (noting the general notion that "international cooperation is
inherently good" and the general belief that international cooperation is "seen as benign and.., for the
most part uninterrogated").
40. Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 18, at 374.
41. See The Policy Laundering Project, supra note 37.
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sure would be on the remaining holdouts in the international community to
agree to new global standards that would not have been adopted had the
policy been deliberated at the multilateral level.
This development is rather unfortunate because less developed coun-
tries, to date, have achieved significant success in pushing for reforms of
the international intellectual property regime. The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, for example, delayed the mandatory
introduction of patent protection for pharmaceuticals and the protection of
undisclosed clinical trial data until January 1, 2016.42 If ratified, the pro-
posed article 3 Ibis will amend the TRIPs Agreement to allow countries
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions
of on-patent pharmaceuticals. 43 In addition, less developed countries suc-
cessfully pushed for the establishment of the WIPO Development Agen-
da.44 They were also able to slow down the patent harmonization process
by delaying the adoption of the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty.45
Outside the intellectual property regime, the economic plight of less
developed countries has earned great sympathy in the human rights, public
health, biological diversity, and information and communications fora, and
among academics and non-governmental organizations.46 There has also
been a growing awareness of the protection of traditional knowledge and
cultural expressions and increasing recognition of the need to develop such
protection.47 In sum, the bilateral and regional free trade agreements were a
major setback to the many achievements less developed countries have
made at the multilateral level both within and outside the intellectual prop-
erty regime.
B. Backdoor Lawmaking
While policy laundering is undesirable and would result in the adop-
42. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
43. See WTO, General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips e/wt164 le.htm.
44. World Intellectual Property Organization, Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a
WIPO Development Agenda, Revised Draft Report, WIPO Doc. PCDA/4/3 Prov.2 (Aug. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_4/pcda.4-3-prov_2.pdf [hereinafter
WIPO Development Agenda Report].
45. For a recent critique of the proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty, see Jerome H. Reichman
& Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DuKE L.J. 85 (2007).
46. See, e.g., Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 21, at 360,
47. For an excellent symposium on the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expres-
sions, see Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2003).
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tion of ill-advised policies, it is particularly problematic from the stand-
point of democratic governance. If left unchecked, policy laundering would
result in what I have described as "backdoor lawmaking"-"a process of
outsourcing the legislative process to an international forum of unelected
representatives in an effort to create laws that the domestic legislature
would not have otherwise enacted."'48 This backdoor process represents
rent-seeking at its best, and the laws created through the process will even-
tually haunt the American people.
The first story shows a failed attempt by the U.S. administration to
engage in backdoor lawmaking. Noticing that Congress was unlikely to
offer sui generis database protection at the domestic level, the administra-
tion went to a multilateral forum-WIPO in this case-to create new inter-
national standards based on laws that its domestic legislature was reluctant
to adopt. Should the draft WIPO Database Treaty be adopted, the resulting
standards will travel back to the United States in the form of international
obligations. These obligations would likely provide both the needed mo-
mentum and new-found justifications for enacting laws that the domestic
legislature initially found unappealing. By presenting the treaty as a fait
accompli, the administration therefore might be able to make an end run
around Congress and the domestic deliberative process. 49
The second story illustrates a different type of backdoor lawmaking,
but one that would hurt both the United States and less developed coun-
tries. Through the use of free trade agreements and forum-shifting strate-
gies, 50 the administration successfully sidestepped the multilateral process
to select a more desirable negotiating forum. In doing so, the United States
forced less developed countries to reopen the TRIPs debate in an undesira-
ble forum without the support of other less developed countries. As Jerome
Reichman noted in the context of data exclusivity, "[t]o ignore the clear
evolution of the text in favour of quasi-exclusive rights in regulatory da-
ta... would in effect amount to imposing unbargained-for trade conces-
sions beyond what was agreed in TRIPS." 51
The backdoor lawmaking process is equally damaging to the Ameri-
can people. Because clinical trial data are currently protected in the United
48. Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 54-55
(2006).
49. See Hosein, supra note 37, at 189-90; Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 18, at 374.
50. For discussions of "forum shifting" or "regime shifting" strategies, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE &
PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:
The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 21, at 408-16.
51. Reichman, supra note 36, at 140.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
States, the European Community, and many other countries, 52 there is no
guarantee that those who signed onto the free trade agreements would al-
ways embrace the U.S. model, as compared to, say, the EC model. In fact,
those agreements at times have called for a higher level of protection than
what is currently offered in the United States. 53 Under those scenarios, the
higher standards required by these agreements would eventually flow back
to the United States to further affect the domestic legislative process.
Even if Congress were able to resist the temptation of introducing
harmonizing legislation, these laws might still enter the country in the form
of customary international law when a sufficient number of countries adopt
the controversial provisions in their bilateral or regional agreements and
expressly and consistently recognize these provisions as legal norms go-
verning their state conduct. Although Congress may override these custo-
mary laws through legislation, the potential of their influence on the
domestic legislative and judicial processes and their ability to shape inter-
national discussion are not to be ignored.
Moreover, the international agreements and the network of bilateral
and regional agreements might affect the country's international obliga-
tions by "form[ing] the context for" the interpretation of treaties the United
States has ratified.54 Because of the growing overlap between intellectual
property and other policy arenas, like international trade, human rights,
public health, biological diversity, food and agriculture, and information
and communications, governments and international organizations have
increasingly looked to these agreements as part of a larger overall frame-
work.55 In United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, for ex-
ample, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel noted the need "to seek
contextual guidance ... when developing interpretations that avoid con-
flicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly
contain different obligations. '56
Finally, the United States' obligations under the free trade agreements
52. See Pugatch, supra note 25, at 102-10.
53. See Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for
Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 93 (2004); Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-
anticircumvention, supra note 48, at 41.
54. Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright Law, 49
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 585, 602-04 (2001).
55. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property
Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 13-21 (discussing the increasing complexity of the intema-
tional intellectual property regime). For a recent symposium on the growing complexity of the interplay
between intellectual property and related policy areas, see Symposium, The International Intellectual
Property Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
56. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 6.70, WT/DSI60/R
(June 15, 2000).
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may make it difficult and costly for the country to reduce protection in the
future if it later finds the new standards detrimental to the local economy.
As Anupam Chander reminded us in the context of anti-circumvention
legislation:
FTA [free trade agreements] obligations, it must be remembered, gener-
ally apply equally to the United States. Thus, it is possible that the Unit-
ed States could run afoul of its own FTAs. The FTAs are not term-
limited, though they do permit withdrawal. Should we conclude in the
future that the DMCA anti-circumvention rules are too constricting, we
will have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the FTA, or conform to an un-
congenial rule. Our FTA partners may often lack the internal economic
incentive to seek to enforce the FTA's strict anti-circumvention terms
(though they may take it as a license to reduce their own anti-
circumvention excess), yet they may seek to enforce the FTA once part-
nered with interested multinational corporations engaged in rent-
seeking.57
In sum, the second story is as disturbing as, if not more disturbing
than, the first. Both stories are troubling because the pressing international
needs for higher international standards would likely not have existed had
the administration not "outsourced" the legislative process in the first place.
Policy laundering and backdoor lawmaking are dangerous; they are harm-
ful to both the United States and the larger international community.
III. POLICY RESPONSES
So, what should policymakers do, especially in light of the growing
pressure on the creation of new intellectual property rights to protect data
and the increasing tendency of powerful governments to engage in policy
laundering and backdoor lawmaking to circumvent the domestic delibera-
tive process? This Part proposes four sets of policy recommendations: (1)
focus on the local incentive structures; (2) establish internal and external
maximum limits; (3) explore the intersectionality between intellectual
property and related areas; and (4) develop a balanced policy debate.
A. Focus on the Local Incentive Structures
First, policymakers need to avoid focusing narrowly on the protection
of investment. As I mentioned elsewhere, an emerging "incentive-
investment divide" exists between national and foreign intellectual property
policies. 58 While developed countries are eager to protect the overseas
investment of their nationals, less developed countries overly focus on
57. Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 207 (2006).
58. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 32, at 892-901.
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attracting foreign investment to the point that they ignore the adverse im-
pact of new intellectual property laws on the local incentive structures.
Because many policymakers consider intellectual property protection a
mere bargaining chip among the many trade negotiation items, the one-
size-fits-all standards they obtained through the package deal often fail to
meet local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional
capacities, and public health conditions.
To bridge this incentive-investment divide, policymakers need to de-
couple intellectual property and trade in their policy assessment and care-
fully evaluate the need for new intellectual property standards outside the
trade context. Here, I am not advocating the decoupling of intellectual
property and trade in the international intellectual property system. Coun-
tries should be free to decide whether they want to link intellectual property
with trade in the bargaining process; such bargain linkage may indeed ben-
efit countries if made under the right conditions. Instead, I am arguing for
the decoupling of intellectual property and trade in an assessment of the
need for new intellectual property standards. Because bargain linkage
would likely distort the analysis by ignoring important concerns and side
effects while inducing policymakers to ask the wrong questions, the de-
coupling of intellectual property and trade would provide a more accurate
assessment of the need for these new standards.
If additional incentives are found to be necessary, policymakers need
to explore whether there is an alternative strategy that is less restrictive to
the country's social, economic, cultural, and developmental goals, includ-
ing access to essential medicines, educational materials, computer software,
and information technology; the protection of traditional knowledge and
cultural expressions; the promotion of biological diversity; and the preser-
vation of culture and free expression. This proposal calls for a "less restric-
tive" standard, as compared to the "least restrictive" standard that is often
used in U.S. constitutional law, because the latter would impose too heavy
a burden on those seeking protection and would therefore significantly
reduce incentives for innovation.
As far as policy options are concerned, there is a misguided tendency
for policymakers in both developed and less developed countries to assume
that the property rights model is the only model, or the best one, that is
compliant with the TRIPs Agreement or other commitments under the in-
ternational intellectual property regime. However, other models, such as
compensatory liability rules, awards and prizes, and non-property-based
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moral rights-like protection, may be equally compliant.59 These alternative
models may also be more efficient and economically attractive, and per-
haps even less harmful. In addition, commentators have discussed the po-
tential of using government procurement, publicly-funded research grants,
public-private partnerships, and open source and collaborative models to
generate incentives. Without evaluating all of these alternatives, it is hard
to determine whether the property rights model is as superior as its advo-
cates have claimed.
As a final step, before intellectual property protection is strengthened
or new sui generis rights are created, policymakers need to conduct impact
studies to ensure a holistic evaluation of the ramifications of the proposed
new standards. Those studies have been widely endorsed in the areas of
human rights, public health, and biological diversity and within the WIPO
Development Agenda.60 They become particularly important as intellectual
property protection continues to affect other policy areas.
When I first proposed to decouple intellectual property and trade, a
number of scholars suggested that the coupling of trade and additional poli-
cy areas, such as competition law, is likely to be more beneficial to less
developed countries than the decoupling of intellectual property and trade.
While I understand my colleagues' eagerness to tie the assessment to re-
lated policy areas and to undertake holistic policy analyses, I find this
three-step process more protective of interests of less developed countries
than a complex, gigantic one-step process that requires the consideration of
59. See Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Frame-
work, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1039, 1090-92 (2007) [hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property Interests].
60. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14(l)(a), opened for signa-
ture June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143 (requiring contracting parties to "[i]ntroduce appropriate proce-
dures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that are likely to have
significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to avoiding or minimizing such effects
and, where appropriate, allow for public participation in such procedures"); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit
from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or
Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), 35, U.N.
Doe. E/C.12/GC/I7 (Jan. 12, 2006) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
898586bl dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$FILE/G0640060.pdf
(stating that "States parties should ... consider undertaking human rights impact assessments prior to
the adoption and after a period of implementation of legislation for the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from one's scientific, literary or artistic productions"); WORLD HEATH ORG.,
COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH,
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2006) (stating that "[h]ealth policies, as well
as inter alia those addressing trade, the environment and commerce, should be equally subject to as-
sessments as to their impact on the right to health"), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf; WIPO Devel-
opment Agenda Report, supra note 44, Annex I, 33-38 (outlining recommendations within the as-
sessment, evaluation, and impact studies cluster).
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all the related, yet incoherent, policies. The requirement of impact studies
at this stage, hopefully, will provide the needed holistic analysis.
In undertaking such an analysis, the studies will provide important
information that will help policymakers in less developed countries make
informed judgments in the face of heavy lobbying by developed countries
and their intellectual property industries. They will also ensure that the
nationals and nongovernmental organizations of demandeur countries are
aware of the development-related impact of the policies that their govern-
ments have been pushing abroad.
Even if policymakers decide to ignore adverse impact studies in their
effort to strengthen intellectual property protection, the studies will serve as
a warning about the potential danger to the public, relevant stakeholders,
and nongovernmental organizations. They may also provide valuable in-
formation that can be used to design correction mechanisms should poli-
cymakers realize their missteps. If the impact studies are to be conducted
by an international organization, such as the WTO or WIPO, or funded
solely by developed countries, or at least those countries that push for
stronger protection, the savings will further benefit less developed coun-
tries in the form of technical and legal assistance.
B. Establish Internal and External Maximum Limits
Second, policymakers need to pay close attention to the increased
globalization of the intellectual property system. Although the focus on
minimum standards makes good sense when a patchwork international sys-
tem links the laws and customs of different countries together, the recent
development of a global intellectual property system requires a greater
emphasis on the development of maximum standards. Today, commentators
have repeatedly criticized the one-size-fits-all system brought about by the
TRIPs Agreement and WIPO-led harmonization efforts. While these com-
mentators are correct in noting that one size does not fit all, a bigger prob-
lem is that the size is wrong. As James Boyle reminded us, the size of the
current system is extra large-a size that is too large for less developed
economies. 61
More is not always better, and in the timeless words of Fritz Schu-
macher, "Man is small, and, therefore, small is beautiful." 62 In the copy-
right context, authors need access to a richly endowed public domain to
61. See James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE
L. & TECH. REv. 9, 3-4 (2004), http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/ditr/articles/pdf/
2004DLTR0009.pdf.
62. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 159 (1975).
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* participate in the creative process. The more protection society gives to a
single author, the less access to the copyrighted works thousands, or even
millions, of future authors (and many more consumers) will have. At some
point, the lack of access to needed raw materials and the fear of copyright
infringement lawsuits will prompt future authors to abandon their aspiring
profession.
To strike the balance between access and protection in the intellectual
property system, it is important to locate maximum limits to intellectual
property protection. These limits can be found both internally and external-
ly. Within the intellectual property system, it is important not just to streng-
then the protection of public access rights63 but also to identify the smallest
protectable unit (SPU). 64 Identifying this SPU is likely to be very impor-
tant, as protection continues to move upstream to cover data, gene frag-
ments, and basic research tools.
Article 9(2) of the TRIPs Agreement makes it clear that copyright
protection shall not extend to "ideas, procedures, methods of operation or
mathematical concepts. ' '65 Article 10(2) also stipulates that the protection
of compilations of data or other material "shall not extend to the data or
material itself."' 66 Although these provisions provide a good start, countries
need to devote greater efforts to refine these limiting concepts and prin-
ciples. What does an idea or a procedure mean? What is considered a me-
thod of operation? Is a mathematical concept the same as the one held by
mathematicians and scientists?
In addition to internal limits, policymakers also need to locate external
limits, which can be found in related regimes, such as those governing
competition, human rights, and public health. Examples of these limits are
the concept of "data protection misuse," 67 human rights-based compulsory
licenses, 68 and exceptions that are specially designed to respond to national
63. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 21, 27-28 (2004); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
369, 396-401 (2006).
64. Several commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Size Matters
(Or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 620-35 (2005) (developing a framework for
a "minimum size principle"); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman,
A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2385
(1994) ("Features that consist of only one or a small number of elements are probably too small in
relation to the software product as a whole to affect investment incentives. Hence, they should probably
be exempt from regulation by a market-oriented legal regime.").
65. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 23, art. 9(2).
66. Id. art. 10(2).
67. See Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright Protection of Databases Can Be Constitutional, 28
DAYTON L. REV. 159, 202 (2002).
68. See Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 59, at 1096-99.
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public health emergencies. 69 With the increasing complexity of the interna-
tional intellectual property regime, the need to understand the interactions
between intellectual property rights and rights in other regimes can only
become greater.
C. Explore the Intersectionality Between Intellectual Property
and Related Areas
Third, policymakers need to pay greater attention to the interplay be-
tween the protection of data assets and other related issues, such as trade,
agriculture, health, the environment, education, culture, competition, free
speech, privacy, democracy, and the rule of law. In addition, they need to
examine the potential adverse impact of such protection. They should also
recognize that data responsibility goes hand in hand with data protection. 70
Data protection does not refer to the protection of intellectual property
rights in data alone. In Europe, it refers to the protection of personal data
or-as U.S. academics and policymakers would put it-individual privacy.
Article 15(1) of the EC Data Protection Directive requires each EU mem-
ber state to
grant the right to every person not to be subject to a decision which pro-
duces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him and which
is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate cer-
tain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work,
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.7 1
Article 8(1) also requires each member state to "prohibit the processing of
personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious
or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of
data concerning health or sex life. '' 72
Making a similar wordplay, the abbreviation "IP" can stand for more
than just intellectual property (or industrial profits!). It can also stand for
individual privacy, information policy, international politics (and, of
course, Internet protocol). It is important that policymakers look beyond
just the protection of data as newly established intellectual property rights.
After all, data protection can easily implicate education, culture, and
69. See Weissman, supra note 24, at 165-77.
70. See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV.
135, 165 (2004) ("If information property rights are here to stay, we should consider ways in which
responsibilities of property ownership can be developed and imposed on right holders as part of our
legal system.").
71. Council Directive 95/46, art. 15(l), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC). For an excellent symposium
on the EC Privacy Directive, see Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European Union 's Direc-
tive: The Challenge for the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995).
72. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 71, art. 8(1).
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science (in the case of database protection), as well as food and agriculture,
biological diversity, public health, and human rights (in the case of data
exclusivity).
In fact, the protection of data assets does not necessarily conflict with
the goals of other policies-privacy, for example. The protection of data
assets and that of personal data can easily coexist with each other. For in-
stance, those who stand to benefit from stronger protection of data assets
may also acquire more, and happier, customers if they are able to develop a
stronger respect for personal data. The complementary nature of these two
forms of protection makes good sense, because they involve similar inter-
ests, trade-offs, and challenges. As Jonathan Zittrain pointed out: "The
elements of the information technology revolution that worry intellectual
property holders carry parallel significance for individuals as personal data
holders. After all, whether for profit or dignity, at the core each group de-
sires the same end: control over information." 73
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are significant differences
between the two: their shifting roles and significantly different political
economies. As Professor Zittrain continued:
There is ... a fundamental shifting of roles. In the context of intellectual
property, worry has come largely from well-organized corporate interests
seeking protection against a death by a thousand cuts from "little guy"
information pirates. With privacy, worry has come largely from individ-
uals seeking protection against a whittling away of privacy by well-
organized corporate interests. 74
Likewise, Lawrence Lessig noted:
The big difference between copyright and privacy . . . is the political
economy that seeks a solution to each problem. With copyright, the in-
terests threatened are powerful and well organized; with privacy, the in-
terests threatened are diffuse and disorganized. With copyright, the
values on the other side of protection (the commons, or the public do-
main) are neither compelling nor well understood. With privacy, the val-
ues on the other side of protection (security, the war against terrorism)
are compelling and well understood. The result of these differences, as
any political theorist would then predict, is that over the past ten years,
while we've seen a lot of legislative and technical changes to solve the
problems facing copyright, we've seen very few that would solve the
problems of privacy.7 5
73. Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Priva-
cy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1226 (2000) (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
75. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION. 2.0, at 200-01 (2006).
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D. Develop a Balanced Policy Debate
Finally, policymakers need to understand and recognize the inherent
challenge in finding the appropriate balance between protection and access
in intellectual property and information policies. While rights holders and
maximalists tend to focus on the absolute nature of property-the right to
exclude, in particular-they ignore the many important limitations, safe-
guards, and obligations in the real property system, such as adverse posses-
sions; easements; servitudes; irrevocable licenses; fire and building codes;
zoning ordinances; the rule against perpetuities; and the eminent domain,
waste, nuisance, and public trust doctrines.76
Similarly, cyber-libertarians and the minimalists tend to emphasize the
hackers' motto, "[i]nformation wants to be free," without even mentioning
its diametrically opposite twin, "[i]nformation also wants to be expen-
sive."' 77 This latter rallying cry (or, shall we say, the capitalists' motto)
follows immediately from the hackers' motto in Stewart Brand's oft-quoted
book, The Media Lab. As Brand explained:
Information wants to be free because it has become so cheap to distri-
bute, copy, and recombine-too cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive
because it can be immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension
will not go away. It leads to endless wrenching debate about price, copy-
right, "intellectual property," and the moral rightness of casual distribu-
tion, because each round of new devices makes the tension worse, not
better.78
The two phrases, "information wants to be free" and "information also
wants to be expensive," therefore, go hand in hand with each other. Their
tension, as Brand put it, "will not go away" even with a more advanced
state of technology. In fact, as Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu recently wrote
in response to the hackers' motto, "information does not.., want to be
free. It wants to be labeled, organized, and filtered so it can be discovered,
cross-referenced, and consumed. '79 Writing from a very different perspec-
tive, Marci Hamilton also commented: "Information 'wants' nothing. Like
technology, it is nothing more than a tool that can be used by humans for
76. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 1,6.
77. See Ian R. Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection Measures:
Tilting at Copyright's Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7, 38 (2002). A good example is John Perry
Barlow's well-cited article, which helped popularize the hackers' motto. John Perry Barlow, The Econ-
omy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents & Copyrights in the Digital Age (Everything You
Know About Intellectual Property Is Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84.
78. STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987).
79. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD 51 (2006).
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good and for evil." 80
It is high time that the two sides in the information policy debate en-
gage each other in a continuous dialogue. Information does not want to be
either free or expensive; it wants to be both. More than that, it wants to be
exchanged--exchanged among the different stakeholders! The information
policy debate is not just about the maximalists or the minimalists, copyright
holders or cyber-libertarians, the pro-IP camp or the anti-IP camp. The
debate is far more complex, dynamic, nuanced, and multifaceted than what
a bipolar debate suggests. The positions taken by the various stakeholders
vary from time to time and from market to market. 81 Thus, stakeholders
need to start exploring the common grounds they share while working to
reconcile their differences. In doing so, they may be able to develop a mu-
tually beneficial information policy.
IV. CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY NOTE
To conclude this article, it is instructive to return to the first story of
data protection. Shortly before the presentation of this article in February
2006, the European Commission released its inaugural report on the EC
Database Directive.82 Backed by empirical data, this report is both impor-
tant and insightful; it represents the Commission's first attempt to evaluate
the ten-year-old directive. More importantly, within the context of the dis-
cussion here, the report's findings and recommendations provide an in-
structive lesson on the growing efforts to establish new intellectual
property rights to protect data.
The report found that the Directive not only failed to benefit the Euro-
pean Community much, but also might have harmed the European publish-
ing and database industries. As the report stated, there were 4085 EU-based
database "entries" in 2001, the time when most of the first fifteen EU
member states had implemented the Directive into national laws, but the
number of "entries" declined three years later by close to a quarter to
80. Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Information Era,
in THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: TWENTY YEARS OF CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LA W JOURNAL
xiv, xxix-xxx (Peter K. Yu ed., 2002).
81. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 48, at 31.
82. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST EVALUATION OF DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC
ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (2005) [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT]; see
also James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the EU, FT.COM, Jan. 2, 2006,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-1 lda-ab8e-0000779e2340.html (discussing the report). For an
interesting exchange concerning the EC Database Directive among James Boyle, Thomas Hazlett, and
Richard Epstein, see James Boyle, A Natural Experiment, FT.COM, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4cd4941 e-3cab- I 1d9-bb7b-00000e251 Ic8.html.
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3095.83 Although the Directive aimed to create a level-playing field be-
tween U.S. and European database industries, "the European share de-
creased from 33% to 24% [between 2002 and 2004] while the US share
increased from 62% to 72%. The ratio of European/US database produc-
tion, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996, has become 1:3 in 2004."84
Notwithstanding these disappointing results, the Commission offered
three justifications for the retention of the Directive. 85 First, the Commis-
sion "has received strong representations from the European publishing
industry that 'sui generis' protection is crucial to the continued success of
their activities."' 86 (Surprise! Surprise!) As the Commission explicitly ac-
knowledged, "the attachment to the new right is a political reality that
seems very true for Europe. ' 87 Second, a repeal of the sui generis right
"would require withdrawing, or 'reverse', legislation and that might reopen
the original debate on the appropriate standard of 'originality. '88 Similar-
ly, a reformulation of the scope of the right would "require the Community
legislator to revisit the compromise underlying the two-tier protection in-
troduced by the Directive. ' 89 Third, "[riemoving the 'sui generis' right and
thereby allowing Member States to revert to prior forms of legal protection
for all forms of 'non-original' databases that do not meet the threshold of
'originality', might be more costly than keeping it in place." 90
Although the Commission's analysis is pragmatic, one could only
imagine how much better the European publishing and database industries
would have been had the Directive not been introduced in the first place. 91
After reading this report, many Americans may be thankful that Congress
did not hastily adopt sui generis database protection legislation in response
83. EUROPEAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 82, at 24.
84. Id. at 22.
85. In addition to maintaining the status quo, the Commission provided three other policy options:
(1) repeal the Directive, (2) withdraw the sui generis right, and (3) amend the sui generis provisions.
See id. at 25-27 (discussing the policy options).
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id. These two tiers refer to "a harmonised level of protection of 'original' databases under
copyright and the introduction of a new 'sui generis' right to protect investments in databases." Id. at 10
(citations omitted).
90. Id. at 27.
91. But see Matthias Leistner, The Protection of Databases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 427, 449 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009). Leistner points out that the Commis-
sion's analysis
completely ignores the fact that in the first years after the enactment of the Database Directive
the European database industry had indeed increased substantially and that the crucial de-
crease of database production from 2001 to 2004 might indeed rather be linked to the general
crisis of the information industries in that period or other incidental factors.
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to the EC Database Directive. They may also be grateful to those who
worked hard to lobby against the adoption of the draft WIPO Database
Treaty, which, if adopted, would no doubt sneak back into the country as
laws made through the backdoor.
As a larger part of society migrates to the knowledge-based economy,
information will only become even more valuable. As a result, data protec-
tion will become more important, and those who stand to benefit from such
protection are likely to demand even stronger and more expansive intellec-
tual property rights in data using novel, and often unproven, legal theories.
While policymakers cannot ignore the need to protect the investment of
those who produce, collect, verify, present, and handle data, they also need
to think carefully about the original design of the intellectual property sys-
tem, the scope of its protection, the collateral damage of overprotection (or
underprotection), and the importance of the balance between access and
protection.
The decision to introduce data protection laws needs to be guided not
by faith or speculation, but by empirical data.92 After all, as the European
Commission's report has shown, laws can be politically entrenched, and
amending these laws can be difficult even if they have proven to be ineffec-
tive or harmful.
92. See Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, supra note 48, at 60; Boyle, Two
Database Cheers for the EU, supra note 82. This problem is actually more complicated. It is not just
about the lack of empirical data; it also concerns whether the research is funded by non-self-interested
parties.
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